Case study of Lebanon: can the U.S. build upon socio-economic influences in order to foster good citizenship versus insurgency? by Hoppe, Kirk D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-12
Case study of Lebanon: can the U.S. build upon
socio-economic influences in order to foster good
citizenship versus insurgency?
Hoppe, Kirk D.















Case Study of Lebanon: 
Can the U.S. Build Upon Socio-Economic Influences  















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 






















REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Case Study of Lebanon: Can the U.S. Build Upon 
Socio-Economic Influences in Order to Foster Good Citizenship Versus Insurgency? 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Kirk D. Hoppe 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
          Lebanon has long struggled with tremendous political upheaval.  More recently, they have battled 
with heavy-handed Syrian interference, coped with a large number of Palestinian refugees, wrestled with 
Islamic fundamentalists, and have witnessed several attempts made upon the lives of prominent public 
figures.  The country still remains mired in political inertia and suffers from an inability to institute the deeply 
needed reforms in its political structure and governing arrangement.  A strong factor preventing any 
progress in the Lebanese political process is the emergence of new and potent political will within the Shia 
population charged by the insurgent group Hezbollah.  This project analyzes the roles of Hezbollah in 
shaping the local economic picture among the people of southern Lebanon.  Implications for political and 
military strategists are provided in order to possibly change the perception that Hezbollah is the only 
legitimate force able to provide safety, security, and basic services to a population lacking these essential 
goods, and thus changing the trends for people to strive towards good citizenship versus the 
counterproductive nature of insurgency. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
61 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Lebanon, Hezbollah, Insurgency 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18  
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CASE STUDY OF LEBANON: 
CAN THE U.S. BUILD UPON SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES IN ORDER 
TO FOSTER GOOD CITIZENSHIP VERSUS INSURGENCY? 
 
 
Kirk D. Hoppe-Lieutenant, United States Navy  
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 










Authors:  _____________________________________ 
Kirk D. Hoppe 
 
   
 
Approved by:  _____________________________________ 
Deborah Gibbons, Lead Advisor 
 
    
 
_____________________________________ 
   James Suchan, Support Advisor 
 
    
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Robert N. Beck, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
CASE STUDY OF LEBANON: 
CAN THE U.S. BUILD UPON SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES IN 




   
 
 
Lebanon has long struggled with tremendous political upheaval.  More 
recently, they have battled with heavy-handed Syrian interference, coped with a 
large number of Palestinian refugees, wrestled with Islamic fundamentalists, and 
have witnessed several attempts made upon the lives of prominent public 
figures.  The country still remains mired in political inertia and suffers from an 
inability to institute the deeply needed reforms in its political structure and 
governing arrangement.  A strong factor preventing any progress in the 
Lebanese political process is the emergence of new and potent political will 
within the Shia population charged by the insurgent group Hezbollah.  This 
project analyzes the roles of Hezbollah in shaping the local economic picture 
among the people of southern Lebanon.  Implications for political and military 
strategists are provided in order to possibly change the perception that Hezbollah 
is the only legitimate force able to provide safety, security, and basic services to 
a population lacking these essential goods, and thus changing the trends for 
people to strive towards good citizenship versus the counterproductive nature of 
insurgency. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CASE STUDY OF LEBANON: CAN THE U.S. BUILD UPON SOCIO-
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES TO FOSTER GOOD CITIZENSHIP VERSUS 
INSURGENCY? .............................................................................................. 1 
A. A FORK IN THE ROAD (DECEMBER 2008)....................................... 1 
B. CULTURE CLASH BOUND BY A THIN THREAD .............................. 2 
C. LEBANESE BACKGROUND............................................................... 5 
1. History ...................................................................................... 5 
2. Politics.................................................................................... 11 
3. Economy................................................................................. 12 
4. Culture .................................................................................... 15 
D. THE LEBANON OF TODAY .............................................................. 18 
E. HEZBOLLAH, A SIGNIFICANT HURDLE ......................................... 24 
F. WHY DOES HEZBOLLAH SUPPORT SOCIAL PROGRAMS?........ 28 
G. WHY DOES THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IGNORE THE 
POOR OF SOUTHERN LEBANON?................................................. 31 
H. IS IT TO LATE TO MARGINALIZE HEZBOLLAH?........................... 33 
I. THE CHALLENGE OF MERGING MESSAGE WITH ACTION ......... 37 
J. CHANGES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY?............................... 37 
K. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE (MARCH 2009) ....................................... 38 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 41 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 45 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Help stop the bloodshed flag  (From: Adblogarabia.com)..................... 1 
Figure 2. Contemporary Distribution of Lebanon’s Main Religious Groups 
(From: Global Security.com)............................................................... 17 
Figure 3. Hezbollah Flag  (From: Defencetech.org)........................................... 24 
Figure 4. Hezbollah Area of Operations (From: Republicaupdate.com) ............ 26 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Social Service Outcomes. .................................................................. 39 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Although I am solely responsible for this small case study, it is certainly a 
product of all those that helped in its creation.   
I would like to acknowledge Deborah Gibbons, Ph.D. and James Suchan, 
Ph.D. at the Naval Postgraduate School for their guidance, direction and overall 
assistance in helping to create a product that I will hope will be of some help in 
creating a better world for all to live.  
Special Thanks to my lovely wife Kiley who spent time and effort reading 
and editing this work.  Her support, patience and sacrifice have been essential in 
the accomplishment of this project. 
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. CASE STUDY OF LEBANON: CAN THE U.S. BUILD UPON 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES TO FOSTER GOOD 
CITIZENSHIP VERSUS INSURGENCY? 
 
 
Figure 1. Help stop the bloodshed flag  (From: Adblogarabia.com1) 
Truth is mysterious, elusive, ever to be earned anew.  
Liberty is dangerous, as hard to live as it is exciting. 
- Albert Camus 
 
A. A FORK IN THE ROAD (DECEMBER 2008) 
The President Elect and Secretary of State Elect looked across the Oval 
Office at their new Ambassador to Lebanon.  The president decided to have this 
personal meeting in order to impart the needed importance that Lebanon would 
have in the new administration.  Both the new President and the Secretary were 
thinking that it was more important than ever to cement a good relationship with 
Lebanon if there were to be any hope for a successful peace plan for the Middle 
East.  The President began by saying, “The American people have made it clear 
                                            
1 AdBlogArabia, http://www.adblogarabia.com/ (accessed December 2007). 
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that they are looking for a change in the way the United States does business, 
and I personally believe that they are right.  I’m sending you out to Beirut in 
expectation that we can make some real strides in our relationships not only with 
the Lebanese government, but also with the Lebanese people.   As soon as you 
get out there, I want you to develop your own personal assessment and get it 
back to me here in Washington as soon as possible.”  After leaving the President 
Elect’s home, the new ambassador would need to make every effort to learn as 
much as possible about the key factors that are driving conflict within Lebanon.  
Soon to be on a plane headed to Lebanon, the ambassador knew there was 
much work to be done.  For example, the Lebanese government would need to 
make significant changes to their distribution of services provided to the public 
throughout all regions of Lebanon.  Additionally, the Lebanese government would 
need to develop a well crafted message that can reach out to the masses, at all 
ends of the economic spectrum, and throughout all of Lebanon. 
B. CULTURE CLASH BOUND BY A THIN THREAD 
Lebanon has long struggled with tremendous political upheaval.  More 
recently, they have battled with heavy-handed Syrian interference, coped with a 
large number of Palestinian refugees, wrestled with Islamic fundamentalists, and 
witnessed several attempts made upon the lives of prominent public figures-- 
most prominent of those killed was former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.  His killing, 
in fact, inspired a popular uprising known in western culture as the Cedar 
Revolution.  In combination with the uprising, strong international support for a 
Syrian withdrawal was mounting.  On April 27, 2005 the Syrian military finally 
withdrew all of the troops which it had deployed in Lebanon since 1976.  New 
parliamentary elections were held in May and June of 2005 and a new majority 
coalition of reform-minded, albeit sectarian, leaders came to power with the 
promise to overhaul the Lebanese political system.  Despite these promises, the 
country still remains mired in political inertia and suffers from an inability to 
institute the deeply needed reforms in its political structure and governing 
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arrangement.  Early in 2006, Lebanon owed over $26 billion in foreign debt.  By 
the end of 2006, Lebanon’s debt would grow substantially larger as a direct result 
of the Israeli invasion.  Estimates of the damage alone range as high as 2.5 
billion dollars, and do not account for the loss of productivity due to the war or the 
longer effect that it has had upon their essential tourism industry.2  
In recent years, as the world has been dealing with a war on terrorism 
Lebanon has also had to deal with a growing force within their borders that 
represents a dangerously growing threat of global jihad.  In the two decades prior 
to the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, Islamic radicalism 
in Lebanon as well as the Middle East was flourishing.  Many governments have 
wrongly treated it as only an annoyance rather than a serious threat to their 
security.  However, after September 11th all that changed.  Countries were forced 
to rethink their positions on terrorism and began to pursue, capture, and kill 
terrorists worldwide.  Some would argue that recent events in Iraq have actually 
spurred terrorism.  On a whole, networks are weaker, more decentralized, and 
amorphous.3  An example of this can be seen in Lebanon during the summer of 
2007 where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in a 105-day battle crushed 
Fatah al-Islam terrorists in the Nahr al-Bared camp.  However, in Lebanon, while 
fundamental terrorism has failed in this one instance, Lebanon is still home to 
arguably the most dangerous of terrorist organizations--Hezbollah.  Moreover, 
while many terrorist groups are struggling to survive, Hezbollah claims to have 
actually gained strength in Lebanon.4 
Debt generated by years of conflict obviously has haunted the Lebanese 
economy.  On the other hand, rooted at the base of all the Lebanese years of 
conflict is a convergence of many distinctive cultures.  Samuel B. Huntington’s 
                                            
2 USAToday.com, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-08-07-lebanon-damage_x.htm  
(accessed December 5, 2007). 
3 The Year in Defense, Faircount Media Group, 2007. 
4 Associated Press, Google.com, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gBuFrPW-
4LwEbzRqVIg-_-_16yAAD8SL5BQG0 (accessed November 2, 2007). 
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book Clash of the Civilizations5 has predicted that the battle lines in the 21st 
century would form along major cultural divides.  Moreover, recent events in 
history have indicated that Huntington may indeed be correct.  Albeit, the key to 
success in Lebanon may likely be found along that cultural divide, it is more than 
likely to be a more complex combination of factors that have (and continue to) 
pull this small country in so many directions. 
Late in the fall of 2007, the Lebanese government is finally making strides 
in what may be its last attempts to gain a required two-thirds majority needed to 
elect a new president.  There has been grave concern that the Lebanese 
parliament would fall short of completing this task.  The consequences of this 
failure would be the creation of an alternate government or perhaps the country 
falling back into civil war.  The impasse has mostly been between Pro-Syrian 
which are strongly supported by Hezbollah and Anti-Syrian sentiments.  The 
stand off to date had been exacerbated by Hezbollah party members leaving the 
governing council in protest.  However currently, there has been some progress 
and a consensus for a new president.  General Michel Suleiman has been 
nominated for the office.  As an apparent Pro-Syrian supporter, the election 
would be seen as a victory for Hezbollah. 
So how has Hezbollah grown to be such a prominent political entity?  
Their rise to prominence can be related to an underlying question that will be 
posed here.  How has Hezbollah been able to communicate their vision, and thus 
mobilize a Shia significant political will?  One link to how Hezbollah has 
accomplished this movement can be correlated similar findings observed by the 
brothers Chip and Dan Heath.  In their book Make it Stick, the brothers have 
come up with a simple yet effective method that can be incorporated into a 
Middle Eastern model.  Their argument is that ideas need to be presented as a 
simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, and emotional story.  The brothers 
borrowed the term “sticky” from Malcom Gladwell’s book “Tipping Point.”  
                                            
5 Council on Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19930601faessay5188/samuel-p-
huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations.html (accessed November 25, 2007). 
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Gladwell actually notes that there is a sticky factor, while the Heath brothers have 
expanded on what makes those ideas stick.  In basic terms, Chip and Dan Heath 
argue that a message need not merely to be conveyed, but that it needs to be 
communicated in a way that resonates with everyone who has a stake in the 
outcome.  In relation to what we see in Lebanon Hezbollah has clearly 
communicated their message to those who have a clear stake in the success of 
their own lives.  This happens to be a majority of lower class Lebanese people.6  
Hezbollah has positioned themselves to be the defender of the poor in attempts 
to legitimate whatever actions they take.   
C. LEBANESE BACKGROUND 
1. History  
Lebanon, which is officially known as the Lebanese Republic, is a small, 
largely mountainous country, located on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean 
Sea.  It is bordered by Syria to the north and east, and Israel to the south.  The 
earliest known settlements in Lebanon date far back to earlier than 5000 BC.  
The city of Byblos is actually considered by many archeologists to be the oldest 
continuously-inhabited city in the world.  Considered by some to be a part of the 
Phoenicians’ homelands, these seafaring people were spread across the 
Mediterranean.  From that time on, Lebanon endured two centuries of Persian 
rule and became part of numerous succeeding empires from the Romans on to 
the Ottoman Empire.  In 1916, after 400 years of Ottoman rule and as a direct 
result of World War I, Lebanon became a part of the French Mandate of Syria 
Lebanon.  At this point in Lebanese history, they were actually a largely Christian 
enclave, but an expansion of Lebanon that would include the Bekka valley would 
add many Muslims and Druzes to what was to become modern Lebanon.7   
                                            
6 Chip and Dan Heath, Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die (New York: 
Random House, 2007). 
7 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon (New York: I.B. 
Taurus & Co Ltd., 2004). 
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On September 1, 1926, France formed the Lebanese Republic, and in 
1943 during the midst of World War II, Lebanon gained its independence.  Allied 
forces maintained control of the region until the end of World War II.  In 1943, 
Lebanon established a government based upon an unwritten National Pact.  The 
Pact required the president to be Christian and its prime minister to be Muslim, 
and additionally established other positions within the government that allowed 
all members of society to contribute to a political climate of what would be seen 
as an Arab state.   
As Lebanon's history continued to unfold, the roads to prosperity were 
built upon Beirut's position as a regional center for finance and trade.  Yet, 
independence for the young country was often marked by alternating periods of 
political stability and turmoil.  Five years after gaining independence, Lebanon 
joined its fellow Arab states in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  After an unexpected 
defeat, Lebanon accepted an armistice with Israel, which left approximately 
100,000 Palestinian refugees that had fled Israel and were currently living within 
the Lebanese border. 
Following the June 1967 Six Day War, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) established within Jordan a major base of operations for their 
war against Israel.  Through the late 1960’s, a series of Palestinian guerrilla 
attacks followed by retaliatory raids by Israel against Jordan added a major strain 
upon Jordan's relationship with the United States as well as other Western 
countries.  Additionally, by 1970, it was believed by King Hussein that the PLO’s 
leader Yasser Arafat was attempting to overthrow him.  Since he viewed the 
PLO’s operations against Israel as a threat to Jordan, King Hussein forced the 
PLO and its people to leave Jordan, thus causing the Palestinian population in 
Lebanon to swell to over 300,000 refugees.8 
 
                                            
8 Palestine Facts, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_jordan_expel_plo.php 
(accessed November 25, 2007). 
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The PLO would soon become ensconced in Lebanon, controlling the 
network of Lebanese refugee camps, essentially creating a state within a state.  
Unfortunately, they lived in generally miserable conditions and even now little has 
changed.  Today, many Lebanese Shiites often regard the Palestinian population 
with suspicion.  While there are some Palestinians that have ties with Hezbollah, 
there are yet secular Palestinians that are angered by Hezbollah’s influence over 
the Palestinian cause, leading one Palestinian official to note “There [are] no 
Israeli settlers in Southern Lebanon.”9  The Palestinian piece in the overall 
fragmentation of Lebanon has been as yet another catalyst for violence within 
their borders.  Particularly, their largest role was to instigate conflict between 
Israel and Lebanon eventually drawing Israeli forces up into the countryside.     
In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon.  Beyond the loss of life, the toll of 
this all-out civil war was a fragmentation of the country along religious lines.  
What were once vibrant mixed neighborhoods atrophied as their inhabitants 
found themselves forced to move to areas that were dominated by their own 
religious groups.  As the country spiraled into chaos, two outcomes were 
considered possible.  The first was an establishment of an independent Christian 
state on Mount Lebanon, the second the creation of a radical, hostile state on the 
Syrian western border. Neither of these outcomes was considered acceptable to 
the Syrian government, so in the summer of 1976 Syria intervened militarily on 
the side of the Christians by sending in troops to stop the fighting and thus 
potentially saving them from total defeat.  The Syrian army would bring a swift 
end to the fighting.  However, the decision would provoke outrage from much of 
the Arab world.10 
From its new position north of Israel, the PLO supported guerrilla attacks 
into Israeli territory, and in 1978 Israel responded by invading Lebanon in an 
attempt to crush the PLO.  Only four days into the invasion, the U.N. issued 
                                            
9 Adam Shatz, In Search of Hezbollah, The New York Review of Books, vol. 51, no. 7, April 
29, 2004. 
10 Lebanon Civil War, globalsecurity.org (accessed November 1, 2007). 
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Resolution 425, which demanded Israeli withdrawal and established a U.N. 
monitoring force in southern Lebanon.  In 1982, Israel would again invade 
Lebanon, with the intent of fully crushing the PLO. The invasion was successful 
in crippling the PLO, but was considered by the Israeli’s as a quagmire that 
would last for three years.11   
The Lebanese Civil War lasted for over fifteen years, devastating a once 
prosperous economy and resulting in massive loss of life and property.  
Estimations are that as many as 100,000 were killed, and another 100,000 were 
left permanently handicapped during the long and bloody civil war.  Additionally, 
up to one-fifth of the pre-war resident population, or about 900,000 people, were 
displaced from their homes with perhaps a quarter of a million emigrating 
permanently.12 
The war ended in 1990 with the signing of the Taif Agreement adjusting 
the ratio to grant equal governmental representation to both Christians and 
Muslims.  Prior to Taif, the Christian community had a disproportionate share of 
power within Lebanese politics.  During the civil war, Lebanon was invaded and 
occupied by Israel in 1978 and again in 1982 in attempts to quell Palestinian 
attacks from Southern Lebanon.  Israel would then remain in control of Southern 
Lebanon until the year 2000.  By that time a consensus developed in Israel to 
withdraw their forces due to the continuous guerrilla attacks that were executed 
by, now, Hezbollah militants.  Additionally, it was believed by the Israelis that 
Hezbollah activity would diminish and eventually stop without their presence on 
the ground.13 
Meanwhile, from 1976, Syrian forces would remain within the rest of 
Lebanon until the Cedar revolution of 2005.  Syria’s stated reason for remaining 
                                            
11 SeattleTimes.com, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/mideast/wars/ 
(accessed November 6, 2007). 
12 Lebanon Civil War, globalsecurity.org (accessed July 27, 2007). 
13 Israel Ministry of Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/Withdrawal+from+Le
banon-+Press+Briefing+by+FM+Levy.htm (accessed July 27, 2007). 
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in Lebanon was that they were there to maintain the peace, but in actuality they 
remained to use Lebanon as a buffer against Israel.  As Syria controlled the 
northern portion of Lebanon, Israel’s control of southern Lebanon would be 
contested by the Hezbollah militia as they wrestled against Israel to gain control 
of the area.  To this day a border region called the Sheba Farms is still hotly 
disputed, with Hezbollah declaring that it will not disarm until this area has been 
liberated.  Although Syria withdrew its military forces from Northern Lebanon, 
intelligence assets still remain, and Syria continues to exert a strong political 
influence within the country.  After fifteen years of civil war, Lebanon would see a 
short period of relative calm. 
In July of 2006, Hezbollah guerillas crossed into Israel, killed three Israeli 
soldiers, and kidnapped two others, precipitating a war with Israel.  Although 
Lebanon had done nothing as a state to provoke Israel, it still found itself 
suffering as a result of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.  Israeli air 
strikes hit Hezbollah positions in the south as well as strategic targets throughout 
Lebanon.  Additionally, Israeli ground forces moved into southern Lebanon in an 
attempt to rout Hezbollah forces.  However, Hezbollah resistance was more 
resilient than expected.  Standing firmly against the ground attack, they clung to 
their only effective option, asymmetric warfare.  They fired thousands of rockets 
at civilian targets in Israel, and forced Israeli troops to pry them out of the civilian 
population.  By the time, the war ended, on August 14, an estimated 1200 
Lebanese civilians and hundreds of Hezbollah fighters had died, along with 119 
Israeli military and 43 Israeli civilians. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the war, provided for a 
ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal and lifting of blockades, disarming of Hezbollah 
and other militias, and a ban on unauthorized weapons transfers into Lebanon. 
More importantly, Lebanese forces deployed to southern Lebanon and the border 
with Israel for the first time in almost four decades.  Although the Lebanese Army 
did finally deploy in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah still remains armed simply 
because they maintain popular support among the people. The Lebanese Army 
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does not have sufficient strength to carry out the task to disarm Hezbollah and 
many in the army are sympathetic to Hezbollah. Furthermore, no other country is 
willing to sacrifice what is required to disarm the group.  So both the United 
Nations and the Lebanese government have learned to deal with a fully armed 
Hezbollah and have no real intention other than political rhetoric to disarm the 
group.14 
In the last few years, as Lebanon has struggled to unify itself as a country, 
sectarian violence continues to try to pull it apart.  In February of 2005 Prime 
Minister Hariri was assassinated.  By November of 2006, as the new prime 
minister’s cabinet neared approval of the Hariri tribunal, pro-Syrian ministers, 
including all the Shiite ministers, withdrew from his cabinet. Led by Hezbollah, 
pro-Syrian forces began months of massive demonstrations, sit-ins, and 
occasional violence that was intended to either paralyze or bring down the 
cabinet.  On November 21, 2006 the Minister of Industry, Pierre Gemayel, son of 
ex-president Amin Gemayel, was assassinated. However, possibly due to all the 
violence that Lebanon had endured during recent years, the people of Lebanon 
showed a great resolve to take ownership of their country.  On February 14, 
2007, hundreds of thousands of defiant Lebanese gathered peacefully in Martyr’s 
Square to commemorate the second anniversary of former Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri's assassination. The large number proved that the Cedar Revolution was 
still fresh in the minds of the people, especially when the crowds turned the 
commemoration into a defiant opportunity to blame Syria and Hezbollah for 
Lebanon's problems.  The demonstrators fell silent at exactly 12:55 PM, the time 
of the explosion that killed Hariri.  Only the muezzin making the Islamic call to 
prayer and the solemn tolling of church bells could be heard, a refreshing 
reaffirmation of the coexistence that can be possible in Lebanon.15 
                                            
14 Foreign Affairs.org, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86110/peter-r-
neumann/negotiating-with-terrorists.html (accessed December 10, 2007). 
15 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cedar_Revolution (accessed August 1, 2007). 
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As portions of the Lebanese people have begun to mend their differences, 
there are still those that are left with grievances.  Lebanon is home to more than 
350,000 Palestinian refugees, some 215,000 of whom live within what are known 
as camps.  The camps themselves are, in reality, urban agglomerations whose 
alleys, through decades of tragedy and frustration, have grown into warrens of 
fanaticism.  They are cities unto themselves, but cities set aside from any form of 
Lebanese political or institutional control.  They consist of the descendants of 
those who fled from the British Mandate of Palestine during the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War. As in many other Arab countries, Lebanese citizenship is unavailable to 
these Palestinians, and many are banned from all but menial jobs in Lebanon, 
forcing them to mostly live off aid provided by the United Nations. In 1962, 
Palestinians were categorized as foreigners in Lebanon, regardless of how long 
they had lived there. Non-Lebanese, which included the refugees, were restricted 
from working in over 70 skilled professions until 2005, when new legislation 
officially opened to them 50 of these jobs.   
2. Politics 
Due to its sectarian diversity, Lebanon follows a special political system, 
known as confessionalism.  This system of government was devised to distribute 
power as evenly as possible among different sects and to facilitate the interaction 
of all of Lebanon’s cultural diversity.  It has been seen by many as a failed 
system that is unable to work during times of crisis.16  The system, set in place 
by the unwritten “National Pact,” attempts to fairly represent the demographic 
distribution of the various religious sects within the political system.  In addition to 
the religious separation of power at the top levels of government, distribution of 
the 128 parliamentary seats is divided in half between Muslims and Christians.  
Prior to 1990, the ratio stood at 6:5 in favor of Christians; however, as mentioned 
earlier, the Taif Accord adjusted the ratio to grant equal representation to 
                                            
16 Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects, www.usip.org (accessed July 13, 
2007). 
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followers of both religions.17  According to the constitution, direct elections must 
be held for seats in parliament every four years, although for much of Lebanon’s 
recent history civil war precluded the exercise of this right.  After Parliamentary 
elections, the Parliament elects the president for a non-renewable six-year term.  
The President then will appoint the Prime Minister based upon the nomination of 
the parliament.  Following consultations with the parliament and the President, 
the Prime Minister will form the Cabinet, which also adheres to a sectarian 
distribution that is established by confessional system of governance. 
Lebanon's judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. Juries are not 
used in trials. The Lebanese court system consists of three levels: Courts of First 
Instance, Courts of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation. Additionally there is a 
system of religious courts that have jurisdiction over personal status matters 
within their own communities.  These courts rule on matters such as marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance.  Lebanon also has a system of military courts that has 
jurisdiction over civilians for crimes of espionage, treason, and other crimes 
considered to be security-related. These military courts have at times been 
criticized by human rights organizations. 
3. Economy  
Of all the Arab nations, Lebanon has clung tightly to its roots within the 
Ottoman Empire tradition.  Paradoxically, it is also the one country in the Middle 
East that is the most receptive to western values.18  Today Lebanon's economy 
has followed in step with their past preferences of favoring strong fiscal and 
monetary freedoms, as well as developing a labor market that is highly flexible.  
Additionally, corporate tax rates and inflation are relatively low.  The financial 
sector was well developed prior to the civil war and has since developed again 
                                            
17 United States Institute of Peace, 
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(accessed July 27, 2007). 
18 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country:  Myths and Realities of the Wars in 
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into an able-bodied system aligned to fit the demands of the region, including a 
range of private banks and services.19  However, freedom to conduct business, 
investment opportunities, and property rights are mired by a layer of corruption 
that permeates the Lebanese countryside.  Intrusive bureaucracy makes doing 
business in Lebanon more difficult because of the need to raise larger sums of 
capital in order to just start a business.  More significantly, the generally chaotic 
regulatory regime deters much needed foreign capital from entering the country.  
Fair adjudication of property rights are not guaranteed because the Lebanese 
courts are subject to significant influences from the Lebanese security services 
as well as the police.  In order to create a more productive and stable business 
environment, it is essential that Lebanon work diligently on improving its ability to 
stamp out fraud.20 
Until the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990, the country had 
enjoyed relative calm and prosperity.  Tourism, agriculture, and banking all 
promoted an economy that made it known as the banking capital of the Arab 
world and the "Paris of the Middle East.”21  Before the war, Lebanon had a 
competitive and free market environment and a strong laissez-faire commercial 
tradition.  There were no restrictions on foreign exchange or capital movement.  
Bank secrecy was strictly enforced, although Lebanon has recently adopted new  
laws to combat money laundering. There were practically no restrictions on 
foreign investment, and currently there are no country-specific U.S. trade 
sanctions against Lebanon. 
The 1975-1990 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic 
infrastructure, cut national output by half, and all but ended Lebanon's position as 
a Middle Eastern banking hub. The subsequent period of relative peace enabled 
the central government to restore control in Beirut, begin collecting taxes, and 
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regain access to key port and government facilities. Furthermore, economic 
recovery has been helped by a financially sound banking system and resilient 
small- and medium-scale manufacturers, with family remittances, banking 
services, manufactured and farm exports, and international aid as the main 
sources of foreign exchange. Real GDP expanded by 23% between 1994 and 
1997.22 
Immediately following the end of the civil war, there were extensive efforts 
to revive the economy and rebuild the national infrastructure. By early 2006, a 
considerable degree of stability had been achieved throughout much of the 
country, Beirut's reconstruction was almost complete, and an increasing number 
of foreign tourists were beginning to head towards Lebanon's resorts.  But when 
fighting began in July of that year, the U.S struggled to get as many as 10,000 
Americans out of the country.  After only a month of fighting, Lebanon suffered 
significant damage to businesses and infrastructure.   
The Beirut airport (Rafiq Hariri International Airport) was able to re-open in 
September 2006, and the efforts to revive the Lebanese economy have been 
proceeding slowly. Major contributors to the reconstruction of Lebanon include 
Saudi Arabia and the European Union as well as money from all parts of the 
world.23  Lebanon’s recent economic history has been a series of taking one step 
forward and two steps back.  Yet, there is still promise for a bright future if peace 
can be maintained within this tumultuous area of the world.  
U.S. concern and involvement has also been significant.  A program of 
relief, rehabilitation, and recovery has been in force from 1975 to 2005 and has 
totaled more than $400 million in aid to Lebanon. For relief, recovery, rebuilding, 
and security in the wake of the 2006 war, the U.S. Government substantially 
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stepped up this program, pledging well over $1 billion in additional assistance for 
the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years. This support reflects not only humanitarian 
concerns and historical ties but also the importance the United States attaches to 
sustainable development and the restoration of an independent, sovereign, 
unified Lebanon. Some of this current funding is used to support the activities of 
U.S. and Lebanese private voluntary organizations engaged in rural and 
municipal development programs nationwide, improve the economic climate for 
global trade and investment, and enhance security and resettlement in south 
Lebanon. The U.S. also supports humanitarian demining and victims' assistance 
programs.24 
4. Culture 
Modern Lebanon has been for thousands of years enriched by a varied 
cultural infusion of civilizations. Usually one looks to the past to garner some 
sense of a people’s identity, yet in Lebanon even this has proven contentious.  
Official public schools serve only 46% of the population.  This lack of a 
comprehensive public education program is a vulnerability that Hezbollah has 
been able to successfully exploit by providing the schooling as well as various 
other services that the people would otherwise go without, if left to rely upon the 
Lebanese government.  Within Lebanon there are over 20 different histories 
presented in Lebanese school books.  This creates a system that is highly 
selective and contradictory, showing that even history can be in a state of war.25   
Originally home to the Phoenicians, the land was subsequently conquered 
and occupied by the Assyrians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the 
Byzantines, the Arabs, the Ottoman Turks, and most recently, the French.  
Through the millennia, the Lebanese culture has evolved by borrowing from all of 
these groups. Lebanon's diverse population composed of different ethnic and 
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religious groups had contributed to a country of prosperity.  Compared to the rest 
of the Middle East, the Lebanese people as a whole are well educated.  As of 
2003 87.4% of the population was literate despite only 43% of the children 
enrolled in public schools.26  Part of the gap is explained through the success of 
Hezbollah-funded schooling in southern Lebanon.  Lebanese society is also very 
modern in relation to the rest of the world, and has similarities to other western 
cultures in addition to traditional Arab cultures in the Mediterranean region.  
Lebanon also has a distinctive fusion of Christian and Islamic traditions that have 
been created by serving as a gateway between the Middle East and the Western 
World.  Arabic is the official language of Lebanon, but French is widely spoken, 
as well as English (especially among university students) and Armenian.27 
No official census has been taken since 1932, reflecting the political 
sensitivity in Lebanon over confessional (i.e., religious) balance.  Over the last 
forty years, higher birth rates in the Shiite community, coupled with the influx into 
Lebanon of some 300,000 Palestinians, has caused the Muslim community to 
swell.  Complicating matters, Palestinians, as mentioned earlier, have been 
denied citizenship and the right to work in all but the lowest paid jobs. By 1970, it 
is estimated that Muslims comprised over 60 percent of the total population, and 
by 1975, Muslim leaders were pressing for government representation that 
matched their larger numbers. Today, estimates are as high as almost 75% of 
the population is Muslim (40% Shia, 27% Sunni, 7% Druze), and only about 25% 
are Christian.  Additionally, a small Jewish minority lives in central Beirut, while 
small populations of Kurds and Arab Bedouins live in the Bekaa and Wadi 
Khaled regions. 
                                            




Figure 2. Contemporary Distribution of Lebanon’s Main Religious Groups 
(From: Global Security.com28) 
                                            
28 Global Security.com, (accessed December 8, 2007). 
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D. THE LEBANON OF TODAY 
Lebanon is still struggling to pick up the pieces and put their country back 
together again.  Luckily from an international perspective, the world is eager to 
restore the nation of Lebanon as well.  Pledges from the Paris III Conference 
held in January of 2007 have reached almost 8 billion US dollars in aid for 
Lebanon.  For Lebanon’s own part, they have pledged to push stronger steps 
towards good governance by stemming internal corruption.  This pledge may be 
intended to convince other nations that investing in the Lebanese reconstruction 
will be politically and financially worthwhile.  In reality, cash assistance from other 
nations has arrived at a slow pace.  Clearly, nations and international 
corporations both desire to see some tangible progress prior to diving into a 
Lebanese reconstruction effort that will simply be wasted capital.29 
The international community is wary for a number of reasons, part of 
which is based upon the large sums of money that have already been given to 
Lebanon.  A 2007 report, about Lebanon, published in the Managerial Auditing 
Journal found a significant “reasonableness gap” between the auditors' 
understanding of their profession compared with the perceptions of those they 
were auditing, particularly in respect of fraud detection.  The overall perception 
was a weak image of the Lebanese accounting profession compared with 
worldwide audit practices or with the technical qualifications of their auditors.30  
In December of 1996, an international meeting to help Lebanon was held 
at the State Department in Washington.  Representatives of international 
organizations, financial institutions, and businesses of more than thirty countries 
attended the conference.  Many of the participating countries pledged financial 
and/or technical help for Lebanon, which badly needed the fiscal assistance to 
sustain reconstruction and development as well as manage the public debt.  The 
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initial U.S. meeting in 1996 was quickly followed by two major conferences in 
Paris, respectively known as PARIS I and PARIS II, which were held 
subsequently to request further help from the international community. 
PARIS I, held on February 27, 2001, was headed by then Prime Minister 
Hariri, and attended by French President Chirac, EU Commissioner Romano 
Prodi, World Bank President James Wolfensohn, European Investment Bank 
Vice-President Francis Meyer, French Finance Minister Laurent Fabius, and 
other prominent European, French and Lebanese officials.  Prime Minister Hariri 
presented an economic reform program that was based on several basic 
elements.  These were to stimulate and modernize the economy, then modernize 
the tax system, ensure the structural improvement of general public finances, 
and preserve monetary, financial, and price stability.  Prime Minister Hariri left the 
conference with great optimism.  The Lebanese government’s reform program 
had won the support of those at the conference. As a result, the World Bank and 
the European Investment Bank agreed to provide Lebanon with 500 million Euros 
to finance their development projects.31   
Paris II, entitled “After Construction and Recovery, Toward Sustainable 
Development,” began a few months later on November 23, 2002. This 
conference was also attended by key officials from several countries and 
multinational institutions.  This conference’s objectives were similar to Paris I, yet 
a little more specific.  The Lebanese representatives were, of course, seeking the 
financial support of the international community, but this time they requested help 
to alleviate Lebanon’s burdensome public debt as well as to reverse the 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances of the Lebanese economy.  In the end, the 
help would consist of extending long-term financing at interest rates significantly 
lower than rates the government had borrowed in the domestic and international 
markets.  Results of the conference were again very successful; $10.1 billion in 
grants and loans resulted from Paris II.32 
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War has caused much of Lebanon’s economic need, yet political strife 
may hinder any additional help.  The Paris III conference (which was recently 
conducted in 2007 as a result of the 2006 war) was not only a plea for 
international assistance, but also an attempt to stem corruption within Lebanon.  
Recently (August 15, 2007), the international investment bank Citigroup warned 
“that the optimism that followed [a] Paris III donors' conference…may fade away, 
due to the continuous internal political bickering which is paralyzing the 
Lebanese government's work and business activity in Beirut.”33   
The Paris III reform program again offered a hopeful way out of a 
mountainous debt.  However, this time around (as opposed to Paris I & II), the 
International community had hoped that spending priorities and structural policy 
made by the Lebanese government would be more efficient.  The International 
Monetary Fund concluded that the success of Paris III would depend on timely 
financial disbursements as well as improvements in the fiscal situation.  This in 
turn, could provide an excellent opportunity to reform monetary policy 
instruments as well.  Most importantly, for any progress to be made, the ongoing 
political stalemate and recurrent outbreaks of violence would need to be curbed 
in order for the nation to be led into economic recovery.   
However, economic recovery and future peace in Lebanon seem to go 
hand in hand.  In order for the Paris III Program to be implemented, there is a 
requirement for a restoration of the foundations for solid growth that would 
include a systematic reduction of corruption throughout all layers of government.  
As government increases its efficiency, it can utilize the additional revenue to 
more efficiently distribute government services evenly across the country.  
Specifically, the Paris III implementation strategy equates to a needed fiscal shot 
in the arm, but if it is too effective, any money received must be used in the most 
efficient means possible.  Included are measures that are equivalent to 
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approximately ten percent of the Lebanese GDP over a five year period.  At the 
same time, restored confidence, produced through structural reforms, would in 
parallel contribute to improved GDP growth.  To enhance the chances of success 
further, the most important step will be to ensure that reforms are properly 
sequenced so that new policies are able to reinforce each other. 
As noted earlier, timely and flexible disbursement of Paris III pledges are 
important elements to the road to economic recovery.  Some progress has been 
made in the release of funds from certain key donors, and negotiations are still 
under way with others.  Public and political support will need to be mobilized to 
sustain reform and adjustment over the medium term.  The financial support of 
the international community (through a phased disbursement of financial 
assistance) provides incentives for successive governments to continue on a 
path of reform.  However, unless these reforms also enhance social and 
economic conditions for the population at large, it may prove difficult to maintain 
the momentum for reform.  The sustainment of high economic growth is vital, but 
the most vulnerable of the Lebanese people (particularly the lower classes of 
Shia in southern Lebanon) will also need to be protected by an effective social 
safety net.34  In the business environment there has been some reduction of red 
tape, streamlining business licensing procedures and targeting improvements in 
public services to enterprises.  Reducing the costs of doing business is an 
important factor in the development of a sound economy.  These measures can 
be more easily implemented through the more rigid use of accounting standards.  
Simply stated, the development of stronger institutional mechanisms will improve 
the control over budgetary outcomes and the quality of spending.   
Additionally, planned reforms in public financial management will help 
enhance the effectiveness of these new policies. The planned establishment of 
debt management institutions within the ministry of finance should contribute to 
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lowering the government's debt service burden.  Again, these must be 
strengthened through the rigid use of accounting measures.  The direction of 
scarce public resources needs to be spread evenly throughout the countryside, 
as well as a reduction in the inefficiencies of public financial management.35 
Much work must be done to push and sustain the Lebanese economic 
revival, but if a critical mass of reform can be reached, then there is much reason 
for hope for Lebanon.  Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point gives us a glimpse 
of the kind of quick change that can occur when a reform or policy reaches what 
Gladwell calls a critical mass.  The title, which comes from the world of 
epidemiology, describes that moment in an epidemic when a virus reaches 
critical mass.  It is “the boiling point.”  This tipping point concept is also similar to 
the point on a graph when a line begins to curve exponentially upward.  The 
AIDS epidemic “tipped” in 1982, when it went from a rare disease affecting a few 
gay men to a worldwide epidemic.  Crime in New York City “tipped” in the mid 
1990's, when the murder rate suddenly plummeted.  The main thought that is 
portrayed in the book is: What if everything has a tipping point?  If this is indeed 
true, we could look for “tipping points” in places like business and social policy, or 
in advertising.  So indeed, in Lebanon, America must strive to find the “tipping 
point” that will help to establish a stable democracy rather than fuel the flames of 
hatred.  Through these measures, the Lebanese economy can again rise to be 
an Arab model of success well into the 21st century.36 
Admittedly, to this point, even the Lebanese Ministry of Finance has stated 
that the lessening of corrupt of practices will be an obvious prerequisite for 
investment and growth.37  Acknowledgment that good governance should begin 
with public service is one approach that the Lebanese government is trying to put 
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into practice throughout the country.38  Many, to include both Shia and 
Palestinians in southern Lebanon, have been ignored in economic terms.  This 
enabled organizations, such as, Hezbollah, to step in and provide services to the 
population that has been relatively ignored, thus undermining the government’s 
legitimacy while building their own.  In order to improve matters, the Office of the 
Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) has prepared an 
administrative reform strategy that addresses the core functions required of a 
modern state. The strategy articulates several objectives that cut across all parts 
of the Lebanese government.  The aim is to create a more transparent, 
accountable and effective public administration that is sensitive to the needs of 
the people.  The stated goals of the government are the development and 
establishment of a modern management capacity in key administrations such as 
the central control and oversight agencies; reduction in the size and cost of the 
public administration through streamlining public organizations; modernizing 
legislation especially those related to public procurement and accounting; and 
finally the promotion of a citizen-oriented administration that is simplified through 
implementation of  basic general procedures in addition to the advancement of 
new technology known as e-Government.39  
Through the objectives of greater accountability and better governance, 
the Lebanese government has approved, and forwarded to the parliament, a 
draft law aimed at the hiring of international and reputable firms to audit public 
finances and public enterprises.  Since the risk of corruption is perceived to be 
prevalent principally in large infrastructure and public procurement projects, 
meeting these new requirements should provide a more efficient use of public 
funds while at the same time enhancing transparency.  Once these reforms are 
successfully implemented, Lebanon can properly fall in accordance with  
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international business standards.  Fighting corruption will also require the 
empowerment of state watchdog institutions that can enforce the new rules 
against senior public officials.40  
E. HEZBOLLAH, A SIGNIFICANT HURDLE 
 
Figure 3. Hezbollah Flag  (From: Defencetech.org41) 
Hezbollah is one of the most successful terrorist organizations throughout 
the world.  Through the use of insurgent warfare, they have managed to drive out 
several armed forces that are significantly better equipped than they are. As will 
be examined later in the study, both the United States, and Israel have fallen into 
a quagmire between rhetoric and action in their confrontations with the 
organization.  Hezbollah is a guerilla organization substantially influenced and 
supported by states such as Syria and Iran, receiving financial resources from 
individuals worldwide who are sympathetic to the cause of the organization.42  
Hezbollah’s cause is based upon combating Western influence, including Israel, 
with intentions of not only forcing their influence from Lebanon, but also from the 
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entire Middle East.  In an “Open Letter,” the organization's manifesto was 
published by the Lebanese daily Al-Safir on February 16, 1985. It emphasized 
"the necessity for the destruction of Israel," as well as Hezbollah's other goals for 
an Islamic regime in Lebanon.  These include laws based on Shariah and a call 
for non-Muslims to "embrace Islam."  Although, Hezbollah has stated that they no 
longer see the possibility of a purely Islamic state, showing that Hezbollah is 
willing to accept the current realities in Lebanon, their initial goals are unlikely to 
have strayed far from their current beliefs.43   
The roots of their cause are solidified by their influence in ending a hated 
occupation of Lebanon, and more importantly the social services they provide 
from the southern suburbs of Beirut, down through the Bekaa Valley, and into the 
southern region of Lebanon, which encompasses approximately 250 small 
villages.44  For most Lebanese people, Hezbollah is far from a terrorist 
organization. They believe the organization’s political goals are clear, while terror 
is defined more as a military tactic.  It is simply a means to accomplish finite 
goals, and casualties are simply an unavoidable byproduct of those necessary 
tactics. 
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Figure 4. Hezbollah Area of Operations (From: Republicaupdate.com45) 
Throughout the 1980’s, various minority Shia formed militant groups that 
would eventually unite into an overarching umbrella known as Hezbollah.  
Specifically, Hezbollah’s armed wing was organized to fight Israeli forces that 
invaded Lebanon in 1982, but their anger quickly turned towards U.S. troops who 
were sent as peacekeepers.  A Hezbollah suicide bombing killed 241 Marines in 
October 1983 (the greatest loss of life imposed upon the American military since 
the Second World War), eventually prompting U.S. forces to withdraw from the 
country.46  This event followed by the quick American exit had significant 
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influence.  Hezbollah would rise to be a dominant force for years to come through 
a perception that they were successfully defending Islamic lands from foreign 
colonial powers. 
Most recently, in their 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah held their own and 
again won the admiration of millions of Muslims by fighting off the Israeli Defense 
Forces for more than four weeks.  Hasan Nasrallah, its current leader, was quick 
to claim victory on Hezbollah’s own al-Manar network as well as the popular al-
Jazeera.  In an Egyptian-based survey, Nasrallah topped the survey of prominent 
public figures ranked by perceived importance.  Particularly interesting was that 
in the same survey none of the current heads of Arab states had been ranked 
highly in perceived importance.  The survey results suggested that these leaders 
are often seen as autocratic, corrupt, inept, or all of the above.47   
It can be argued that ill conceived Western policy has actually created a 
bridge between deep divides within Islam.  Contrary to our attempts to bring 
democracy to the Middle East, we often sow seeds of hate without even realizing 
the results of our actions.  Outside of Lebanon, an example of this is the hatred 
inspired by American forces being staged on Saudi Arabian soil during the First 
Gulf War that initially inspired Osama Bin Laden.  The United States perpetuates 
its bad reputation by often following a double standard.  Past American 
presidents have spoken of bringing democracy to the Middle East while at the 
same time supporting the dictatorships that are willing to fall in line with American 
interests.  While the degree to which this has happened has varied among 
different American administrations, there has been no real shift in American 
Foreign policy in this regard for the last fifty years.  In the past it was the Shah in 
Iran, followed by Sadam Hussein after relations with Iran soured.  Today we 
support King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, and Pervez 
Musharraf of Pakistan.  Concurrently, we denounce the elected government of 
Hamas or chide the elected officials of Hezbollah.  Although there is reason for 
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grave concern in how these organizations operate, we must at the same time be 
aware of the double standard that the US has presented to the Islamic world.48 
F. WHY DOES HEZBOLLAH SUPPORT SOCIAL PROGRAMS? 
Long term objectives of Hezbollah from the beginning have been for the 
annihilation of Zionism, defense against western colonial influences, and the 
establishment of an Islamic state. Also included in their list of goals is the easing 
of oppression and suffering of the Islamic community worldwide.49  Hezbollah 
has also developed short-term objectives that are more pragmatic and 
understanding of the regional and international political and strategic 
environment.  While the destruction of Israel and the ability to mold Lebanon as a 
purely Islamic state are not currently realistic goals, the group has focused more 
energy on practical matters such as survivability and the search for greater 
popular support.50    
Hezbollah’s provision of social programs may prove to be the tipping point 
for their goals of legitimacy.  Not only has it created a larger constituency, but it 
has also aided in the development of a competitive political component in 
Lebanon, and throughout the world with cells that operate in Canada, Europe, 
and several South American countries.51  Additionally, it can be argued that the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 has only aided Hezbollah because the 
devastation caused by Israel to much of Lebanon has provided the opportunity 
for Hezbollah to take credit for rebuilding southern Lebanon while at the same 
time blaming Israel for causing the devastation.52  
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The Lebanese government has historically offered limited social services 
for its Shia citizens in southern Lebanon.  Many of these services tend to be 
located in predominantly Shiite areas, but Hezbollah makes a concerted effort 
not to discriminate, thus employing a consistent effort to serve anyone that 
requests their help.53  In many rural areas throughout Lebanon, per capita 
income is only one fifth to one sixth of the national average.54  The lack of state-
provided social services, coupled with limited or no welfare programs that provide 
safety netting for the general populace, have created a population susceptible 
and willing to be influenced by an organization that helps them with life’s daily 
troubles.  Hezbollah has thus stepped in to offer an array of social services to 
needy constituents who otherwise are neglected by the Lebanese government.  
These services include construction companies, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, 
and even micro-finance initiatives. 
While popular support is significant, Hezbollah does not have the 
resources to cover all the costs associated with the wide array of services they 
provide.  The funding of these services, from trash pickup to significant medical 
infrastructures, are raised domestically, but a much larger proportion comes from 
abroad, primarily because Hezbollah is not the government and thus is unable to 
tax.  In order to survive, Hezbollah receives significant subsidies from Iran and 
Syria.  So much so, that the organization is often seen as a mere proxy for Syrian 
and Iranian foreign policy.55  The group freely admits that it gets much of its 
funding from Iran, but is hesitant to be specific about the amount of aid it 
receives.  Diplomatic sources estimate that this funding could range somewhere 
between $20 million to $40 million per month.56  Additionally, they have sought 
other measures to ensure their financial stability investing their resources in all 
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aspects of the economy.  These investments include investment portfolios, 
cooperative supermarkets, real estate, bookshops, stationers, farms, fisheries, 
textiles, and bakeries.57  In the end, Hezbollah has shaped a rich fabric of social 
services and charitable work.  It has provided an excellent source of aid that 
meets the basic needs of a Shia population who would otherwise find themselves 
impoverished and with little hope.   
As mentioned earlier, this social fabric was put to the test in 2006 by 
Israeli attacks that targeted broad swaths of southern Lebanon, laying waste to 
homes and infrastructure.  Some have charged Israel with "excessive, 
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force" during the conflict.58 The war 
caused an estimated 1,191 deaths in Lebanon and damaged some 30,000 
homes.59  The severe, extensive damage initially overwhelmed many services, 
but Hezbollah’s prompt actions were quick to revitalize these social services, as 
well as compensate those who had lost their homes.  Hezbollah recognized the 
need to meet the needs of the civilian population caught in the middle of conflict.  
This is a vivid example of the competence and professionalism that indeed has 
won the hearts and minds of many Lebanese.  In the end, the general feeling 
among most of the poor in southern Lebanon can be summed up by one 
Lebanese citizen, "Hezbollah is doing all the things for the people. I don't know 
where the government is."   It has become apparent that there has been a void 
left by the state of Lebanon, and Hezbollah has managed to fill that void.60 
Although there seems to be some friction between Hezbollah and 
Palestinians living within Lebanese refugee camps, it can still be said that 
Hezbollah, over the years, has developed more support for the Palestinians living 
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in occupied territories.  By using their proven method of supporting the needs of 
the population, particularly the Shia Palestinians, they are broadening their 
support throughout the Middle East and the world.  Their expansion has been 
pushed by their desire to be seen by the world as a legitimate actor and advocate 
for all groups that face injustice.  Although they have lofty goals, Hezbollah 
actually remains a serious threat to established governments in both Lebanon 
and the Middle East.61      
G. WHY DOES THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IGNORE THE POOR OF 
SOUTHERN LEBANON?   
In Lebanon, there is a weak central government, currently susceptible to 
insurgent efforts as they struggle to maintain their legitimacy as a governing 
power.  On the other hand, there lies the mixed political/terrorist group Hezbollah, 
which is also battling for its own legitimacy in an attempt to control the country.  
To some degree, Hezbollah may coerce popular support, but they have mainly 
chosen to provide much needed services and infrastructure to the poorer citizens 
of southern Lebanon in order to maintain a solid level of popularity.  Thus, 
Hezbollah dominates life in Southern Lebanon.  Yet, why has the Lebanese 
government resigned to simply allow Hezbollah to provide the services that they 
themselves should be providing in the southern part of their country?   
The Lebanese government has produced over the years an uneven 
distribution of funds throughout their country that has been primarily controlled by 
specific families.62  Once more, officials have acknowledged that rebuilding 
efforts in the most badly damaged areas of southern Lebanon are a fault that the 
Lebanese government has yet to overcome.63  What is apparent is that if you live 
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in the right neighborhood (one that is of the correct political and ethnic 
persuasion) then you will be provided with funds for rebuilding.  Money that is 
provided for reconstruction by other countries through the Lebanese government 
only slowly (if at all) works its way to the poorer Shia communities.  At stake is 
control over volatile pieces of real estate, some of which sit directly next to the 
Israeli border.  Although the state is the primary distributer of donated funds, Iran 
and Qatar have decided to directly supervise their own contributions to Lebanon 
due to their own lack of trust in the Lebanese government’s efficiency.64  Since 
Iran has decided to distribute funds directly to needy communities through 
Hezbollah, it is very difficult to estimate how much they have donated and to 
what extent their aid supports the military rebuilding of Hezbollah guerilla forces. 
In the last year, Iran and Qatar have spent millions of dollars, particularly 
within southern Lebanon.  Unfortunately, in the eyes of many Lebanese, 
particularly of those that are less fortunate in Southern Lebanon, their own 
government has done little in rebuilding their portion of the country.  Even those 
projects that are sponsored by the government are often tied to Hezbollah in a 
manner that Hezbollah receives the credit associated with the project.65  The 
Lebanese government’s lack of action in trying to re-establish or repair any of the 
country’s infrastructures in Southern Lebanon creates the perception that the 
Lebanese government has no real interest in the lives of those who live there.  
As a result, the general feeling among many rural and southern Lebanese is that 
the Lebanese government is unconcerned about their lives.66  Moreover, there 
are rampant accusations of the government slowing down payments it has 
collected from international donors.  At best, the government’s response, as 
summed up by an aide to Prime Minister Siniora, can only be an 
acknowledgment that the government has been struggling to gain the edge in the 
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public relations battle over the reconstruction, but the red tape and bureaucracy 
are formidable.67  What is heard, by those still waiting for help is that corruption 
must yet be overcome.   
H. IS IT TO LATE TO MARGINALIZE HEZBOLLAH?   
Tied to whether or not it is to late to marginalize Hezbollah is the question 
posed in the previous section:  Is the current political system able to deal with its 
own levels of corruption?  If corruption can be reduced and a more efficient 
method of resource allocation follows, there will be a plethora of options available 
to the Lebanese government.  As efficiency increases and a wider distribution of 
the nation’s resources are spread throughout Lebanon, the government slowly 
builds its legitimacy with those previously disenfranchised.   This, coupled with a 
carefully crafted message that brings in the Shia community, will simultaneously 
work to marginalize the military wing of Hezbollah.  Hezbollah relies heavily on 
the support of the Shia population in Southern Lebanon.68  If support is slowly 
shifted back to the central government, Hezbollah’s power will fade.    
Simultaneously, significant actors, inside and out of Lebanon, have either 
ignored or encouraged this process of subversion.  Among Syria's closest friends 
in Lebanon is the Shia dominated Hezbollah.69  Many finger a combination of 
Israel, America and Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia as an unwieldy 
consortium of outside actors that want to squeeze Syria and its ally, Iran, out of 
having any control over Lebanon.70  This conflict has been marked by ever-
shifting alliances as well as a dramatic fragmentation of territory.  
Insurgent groups such as Hezbollah generally have a range of ethnic, 
religious, cultural, and blood ties to the local populace.  Additionally, these ties 
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are coupled with shared grievances.  These factors automatically give Hezbollah 
a force of legitimacy.  Although these are some of the reasons that Hezbollah 
has gained their initial traction, Hezbollah was able to further their cause by 
successfully communicating “sticky” messages to the Shia community and to 
potential allies within the Christian community in Lebanon as well.  One example 
of this can be seen with the idea of simplicity.  Hezbollah’s promotion is a simple 
message that their claim to legitimacy is that they exist simply to defend Lebanon 
against Western Imperialism.  This message alone drives home a message that 
they are needed.  
Now that Hezbollah enjoys the status as a legitimate political party in 
Lebanon, there are fewer options to marginalize this one time ragtag militia.  In 
fact, Hezbollah has successfully transformed itself into a powerful political and 
social force. The organization has become a "media-friendly, computer-savvy" 
organization with its own press kits, several Web sites, and a television station 
called Al-Manar, which is officially licensed by the Lebanese government. The  
organization markets a full line of paraphernalia praising the cause, including a 
series of movies and video games depicting suicide bombers and guerrilla 










                                            





A Hezbollah store in Beirut sells a full line of Hezbollah 
paraphernalia. Hezbollah has become an accepted and 
welcomed part of Lebanon's social and political life.  
 
 
A video shows Hezbollah guerrillas during a training 
exercise. Many videos like this are broadcast on 
Hezbollah's television station, Al Manar, which has an 
estimated following of 10 million viewers. 
Figure 5. Hezbollah Media  (From: Pbs.org72) 
To complicate the matter even more, when insurgents are killed, new 
recruits are quickly found.  Consequently, it is often better to discredit their 
means rather than confront them directly.  We often forget that the battle for 
legitimacy and message resonance (stickiness) is many times the key.  Youth 
are attracted to this insurgent cause because it often helps to explain the world 
around them.  In order to pull insurgents towards good citizenship vice 
insurgency, a message must not only be tied to local concerns, but must make 
sense at a basic level. 
Hezbollah’s social infrastructure has obviously worked to endear the group 
to the local populace, but it has also helped to generate domestic support for 
Hezbollah’s functions as a Lebanese political party. It is also rumored that 
Hezbollah's civilian infrastructure in southern Lebanon is routinely used to store 
and utilize rockets, weapons, and other munitions.73  In the course of providing 
services to the public, Hezbollah has built strong amounts of political capital.  By 
building the schools, Hezbollah is also able to use the schools to recruit youth to 
the organization’s ranks.  
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If the Lebanese are going to facilitate a reincarnation of their economy, 
security must be coupled with proper implementation of sound economic 
principles.  Generally, while battling for legitimacy, security for an entire 
population must be ensured paying special attention not to alienate any particular 
part of the populace.  In addition, the international community must also help 
provide for both of these needed factors.  In practice, there are many more 
hurdles that will persist and prove difficult to overcome.  Reconstruction efforts in 
Lebanon after the 2006 war had the goal to strengthen a U.S.-backed Lebanese 
government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.  Hundreds of millions of dollars 
poured in from U.S.-friendly Persian Gulf countries.   
Hope is still held that a new president will develop a consensus that will 
enable the government to forge ahead in order to create a greater Lebanon.  
What message will the new president need to convey in order to make his 
message stick with the full spectrum of communities in Lebanon?  Will this new 
president align himself with Syria or move in the other direction to develop closer 
ties to the United States? Unfortunately, this question can’t be answered at this 
time (December 2007) because of the government’s inability to elect a president, 
and the post currently being vacant.  In fact, Lebanon currently lies at the brink of 
another civil war.74  Further complicating the matter is whether or not the entire 
Middle East may or may not erupt into war.  Talk of war, between Syria and 
Israel, has echoed throughout the Middle East been as the two countries have 
been at odds throughout the entire summer of 2007.75  If the two countries do go 
to war, Hezbollah’s ties with Syria may yet again unwillingly suck Lebanon into 
an undesired war.   
                                            




I. THE CHALLENGE OF MERGING MESSAGE WITH ACTION 
To this point we have identified several key factors that are tugging at the 
Lebanese people.  There is no silver bullet that can fix the myriad issues that 
confront Lebanon, but there are factors that can be addressed that will help point 
this country in the right direction.  To make an impact on the Lebanese people, 
the government must provide a good governance that stems corruption as well 
as a better distribution system that spreads the nation’s resources more evenly 
through all ethnic and religious communities.  In order to accomplish this 
significant task, a simple yet poignant message needs to be communicated to all 
members of the Lebanese society.  This is a message of unity--.a message that 
is already set in place through the development of the Cedar Revolution and one 
that can be developed into a greater cause that builds a stronger nation 
influenced by democratic ideals. 
J. CHANGES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY? 
The United States must begin to develop projects in Lebanon that are 
consistent with U.S. values while supporting Lebanese goals.  It must not appear 
to impose its political and economic will on the country.  The power of a good 
neighbor will far outweigh the forceful intrusion of military bases and troops.  The 
United States needs to build on such experiences like that of Operation Unified 
Assistance, which provided prompt relief to victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami 
of December 26, 2004.  This, of course, was partially a product of response to a 
natural disaster, but more importantly it was responding to the needs of a people.  
Aside from natural disasters, there are always needs that can and many times 
should be addressed.  The remarkable power-projection capability of the U.S. 
military allows a significant response to major natural disasters, but can also 
provide a global reach of assistance on a regular basis.  Assistance rendered by 
the U.S. military early in the first desperate days after the disaster has brought 
fairly dramatic political goodwill for little investment in the past such as the 
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tsunami relief provided in Indonesia.76  In this way, the United States will gain 
significant political respect internationally from helping victims recover from a 
disaster.  The United States should continue to make itself an example of the rule 
of law, for freedom of the press and for the rights of collective bargaining, and 
most of all for democracy.77  In order to truly be a role model for Lebanon and the 
Middle East, the U.S. should lead more by example in ways that can help build a 
strong economy, rather than relying on a boots on the ground approach. 
K. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE (MARCH 2009) 
Looking over all of his studies, the United States Ambassador seemed to 
have a good grasp upon the situation, and was ready to brief the President on 
what areas he felt the United States should be helping the Lebanese to develop.  
Before heading back to Washington for the meeting with the President, he jotted 
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What’s Happening               Established Perception      Outcomes/Trends 
 
Table 1.   Social Service Outcomes.  
Indeed, if there is to be peace in Lebanon, the Ambassador could see 
from his own table that there must be a change in the established perception that 
Hezbollah has created.  In order to be successful, the United States would need 
to assist the Lebanese government in the reestablishment of their own legitimacy 
by influence and direct intervention.  This can be accomplished through the 
development of services that are sponsored and controlled by the state vice 
Hezbollah.  As the state takes control of this area, they will then be able to slowly 
work towards other areas such as the disarmament of Hezbollah.  Through 
economic reform, provision of services, and use of sticky messages about the 
Lebanese government’s successes, predictions of dismal outcomes and trends 
will instead be altered to predictions of success and prosperity that stretch 
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only legitimate force 
that is able to 
provide what is 
needed in order to 
live a life where 
basic services are 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41
LIST OF REFERENCES 
ABC News. abc.com. 
http://www.abcnews.go.com/WNT/Mideast/story?id=2189860 (accessed 
November 3, 2007). 
AdBlogArabia, http://www.adblogarabia.com/ (accessed December 8, 2007). 
Ahmed, Akbar. 2007. Journey into Islam.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute 
Press. 
AlertNet.org, Reuters Foundation, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L01838471.htm (accessed 
November 3, 2007). 
Anti-Defamation League. 
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/hezbollah_overview.htm?Multi_page_s
ections=sHeading_7 (accessed December 5, 2007). 
Associated Press. Google.com. http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gBuFrPW-
4LwEbzRqVIg-_-_16yAAD8SL5BQG0 (accessed November 2, 2007). 
BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6205810.stm (accessed 
December 10, 2007). 
BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6982331.stm (accessed 
December 10, 2007). 
Blanford, Nicholas. 2006. Killing Mr. Lebanon. London: I.B. Taurus. 
Casebeer, William D., and Timothy A. Kraner. 2005. Using Innovations in Social 
Movement Theory to Understand and Influence Hizballah’s Developmental 
Trajectory:  Strategic Insights, vol. IV, Issue 5, Center for Contemporary 
Conflict. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
CCN.com. 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/24/schuster.hezbollah/index.
html (accessed October 25, 2007). 
CIA Factbook. Lebanon (accessed August 7, 2007). 
Council on Foreign Affairs. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19930601faessay5188/samuel-p-
huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations.html (accessed November 25, 2007). 
 42
Council on Foreign Relations,  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9742/new_focus_on_ussoutheast_asia_milit
ary_ties.html (accessed December 10, 2007). 
Foreign Affairs.org, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86110/peter-r-
neumann/negotiating-with-terrorists.html (accessed December 10, 2007). 
For Lebanon. http://www.forlebanon.net/bio.htm (accessed August 31, 2007). 
FoxNew.com. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,293616,00.html (accessed 
November 13, 2007). 
FrontLine World. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/lebanon/tl05.html 
(accessed November 13, 2007). 
Gladwell, Malcolm. 2000. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big 
Difference. New York: Little Brown and Company. 
Global Security.com, (accessed December 8, 2007). 
Harper’s Magazine. http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/03/sb-augustus-no-
1173896326 (accessed October 25, 2007). 
Heath, Chip and Dan. 2007.  Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and 
Others Die. New York: Random House.  
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 2006.  “The ‘New Middle East’ Bush is resisting,” 
Washington Post. August 23. 
International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2007/052807.htm 
(accessed August 15, 2007). 
Israel Ministry of Affairs. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/200
0/Withdrawal+from+Lebanon-+Press+Briefing+by+FM+Levy.htm 
(accessed July 27, 2007). 
Kaufman, Asher. 2004. Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon. 
New York: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd. 
Lebanon Civil War. globalsecurity.org (accessed November 1, 2007). 
Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects, www.usip.org (accessed 
July 13, 2007). 
Lebanon: Treasure of the Middle East, gonomad.com. (accessed July 13, 2007). 
 
 43
Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
reconstruction17aug17,1,6974846.story?coll=la-headlines-world 
(accessed August 17, 2007). 
Military.com, Defenetech.org (accessed December 8, 2007). 
Norton, Augustus Richard. 2007. Hezbollah: A Short History.  Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Palestine Facts. 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_jordan_expel_plo.php 
(accessed November 25, 2007). 
Picard, Elizabeth. 2002.  Lebanon: A Shattered Country:  Myths and Realities of 
the Wars in Lebanon, Revised Edition, New York: Homes and Meier. 
Posen, Barry R. 2007. “The Case for Restraint.” The American Interest, vol. III, 
no. 2. November/December. 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Rebuild Lebanon. Human, Economic and 
Infrastructure Recovery. 
http://www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb/images_Gallery/Paris%20III-
Second%20Progress%20Report.pdf (accessed July 27, 2007). 
Quilty, Jim and Lysandra Ohrstrom, 2007.  “The Second Time as Farce: Stories 
of Another. Lebanese Reconstruction,” The Middle East Report, Summer. 
Republicaupdate.com (accessed December 8, 2007). 
Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Finance. 
http://www.finance.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/89C37627-828E-4626-9F00-
9A6498BB4082/0/ParisIIIEngVersion.pdf (accessed August 9, 2007). 
Rueda, Edwin O. 2001. New Terrorism? A Case Study of Al-Quaida and the 
Lebanese Hezzbollah, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.  
SeattleTimes.com. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-
world/mideast/wars/ (accessed November 6, 2007). 
Shatz, Adam. 2004. In Search of Hezbollah, The New York Review of Books, vol. 
51, no. 7, April 29. 
Sidani, Yusuf Munir. 2007.  “The audit expectation gap: evidence from Lebanon,” 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 22 




BANON.PDF (accessed July 27, 2007). 
The Daily Star. Business Articles. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=3&article_id
=84544 (accessed August 29, 2007). 
The Heritage Foundation. Index of Economic Freedom, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=Lebanon 
(accessed August 9, 2007). 
The New York Sun. http://www.nysun.com/article/37184 (accessed August 15, 
2007). 
The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/AR2006071700912.html (accessed 
November 5, 2007). 
The Year in Defense. 2007. Faircount Media Group. 
U.S. Department of State. Background Note: Lebanon February 2007 (accessed 
July 13, 2007). 
United States Institute of Peace. 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0330_lebanon_confessi
onalism.html (accessed July 27, 2007). 
USAToday.com. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-08-07-lebanon-
damage_x.htm (accessed December 5, 2007). 




(accessed November 3, 2007). 
 45
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
